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Abstract. The incidence of public expenditure in education appears to be skewed in favour of the middle 
and upper classes. This paper inquires into the determinants of this bias using a political economy approach. 
We develop a model with two time periods with an election occurring between the two. In the first period, 
agents differ in their initial wealth; in the second period, differences in wealth are combined with differences 
in income. In the first period, the incumbent government issues debt to finance public spending in education 
and decides how to allocate available resources between primary and tertiary education. Both increase 
aggregate income, but while investment in primary education reduces income inequality, investment in 
tertiary education increases it. At the beginning of the second period, a two-party electoral competition is 
held and probabilistic voting decides the winner. By varying the parameters of the linear income tax, the 
elected policy-maker can redistribute resources between low and high income individuals, while by choosing 
a debt default rate she can renege on the promise to fully repay public obligations, redistributing resources 
from bond-holders to tax-payers. We show that the investment in primary education might not be 
(politically) viable. Intuitively, investment in primary education, by reducing income inequality with respect 
to wealth inequality, might increase the desired debt default rate of future policy makers, making issuing 
debt to finance primary education unfeasible.  
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1. Introduction 
Public spending in education is a pervasive feature of modern economies. It accounts, on average, 
for more than 4.5% of GNP and more than 14% of total government expenditure1. 
Public provision of education is usually justified as a (politically acceptable) mean of redistributing 
income. However, demand for education is not homogeneously distributed across social groups. 
Specifically, data on university attendance show a persistent gap between attendance by the better-
off and by the less well-off 2. This implies that the redistributive effects of education expenditure 
strongly depend on which education level is funded.  
By disaggregating spending over educational levels, Zhang (2002) shows that more unequal 
societies tend to spend proportionately more on high levels of education3. Furthermore, regression 
results reveal that countries spending more on tertiary education today tend to experience more 
unequal income distribution in the future. Thus, the allocation of public education spending might 
be responsible of persistent inequality. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a political economy model capable of accounting for these 
stylized facts.  
We develop a two-period dynamic model of representative democracy, which incorporates public 
investment in education and redistribution, à la Besley and Coate (1998 and 2000). In the first 
period, there is no production and agents differ in their initial endowment of a consumption good. 
The incumbent government issues debt to finance public spending in education. Each individual 
divides his endowment between consumption and the acquisition of government bonds. Aggregate 
savings determine the amount of resources which can be spent in education. The government can 
choose the type of investment: it can either invest in "primary" education or in "tertiary" education.  
In the second period, the consumption good is produced using labour and differences in 
agents’wealth are combined with differences in income deriving from different levels of 
productivity. First period’s spending in education affects second period’s labour productivity. 
Investment in primary education benefits low productivity individuals thus reducing income 
inequality. Tertiary education benefits high productivity individuals, thus increasing inequality. 
At the beginning of the second period a two-party electoral competition is held. Each party chooses 
a citizen-candidate by majority voting and probabilistic voting decides the winner4. According to 
her preferences, the elected policymaker decides the parameters of a linear income tax (fiscal 
                                                 
1
 Data source: various issues of the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook. 
2
 Se De Fraja (2005) for a discussion of this point. 
3
 See also Gradstein (2003). 
4
 See Besley and Coate (2000) for a similar description of the political process 
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policy) and sets the debt default rate (debt redemption policy) 5. By varying the parameters of the 
linear income tax, resources can be redistributed between low and high income individuals. By 
increasing the level of the debt default rate, the policymaker can redistribute resources from bond-
holders to tax-payers.  
Although each party chooses a citizen-candidate by majority voting, the bi-dimensionality of the 
second period policy choice, together with the fact that individuals have only one vote, causes that 
political outcomes on specific issues might not be congruent with the preferences of the majority of 
the winning party’s members6. Specifically, we show that, even if the majority of the two parties’ 
members, as well as the majority of the population, prefer to renege on the promise to fully repay 
debt, if this issue is salient ( i.e benefits deriving from the preferred debt redemption policy exceed 
benefits deriving from the preferred fiscal policy) only for a minority of individuals, who prefer full 
debt repayment, the political equilibrium will feature no default with probability one7. 
Consequently, in order to exclude a political equilibrium featuring debt default, individuals who are 
pro-default should care more about fiscal policy than debt redemption policy. In these 
circumstances, the investment in primary education, which reduces income inequality, might be 
unfeasible. In fact, since reduced income inequality causes the debt redemption policy to become 
more relevant for voters (i.e. gains from preferred debt redemption policy increase relative to gains 
from preferred fiscal policy), if a sufficient fraction of the population regards this issue as the 
salient dimension, then, with probability one, the elected policymaker will share the preference of 
the majority, which we assume to favour repudiation. Thus, in the first period, nobody would buy 
goverment bonds. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 related literature is discussed. The model 
is illustrated in section 3. In section 4 the political process is presented and then the political 
equilibrium is characterised. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Related literature  
Standard political-economic theory, based on the median voter approach, predicts a positive 
association between inequality and redistribution. The proposed explanation is that greater 
inequality, by reducing the income of the median voter relative to the country’s mean income, 
                                                 
5
 As underlined by Dixit and Lodregan (2000) p.1”... if explicit default is rare, governments can easily renege on their 
promise to repay their debt by devaluing obligations using devices like inflation...”. Thus, the debt default rate can be 
thought as an “inflation tax”. 
6
 See Besley and Coate (2000). The authors show how the bundling of issues might prevent electoral competition from 
producing majoritarian outcomes on specific issues. 
7
 Di Gioacchino et al (2004) apply Besley and Coate’s (2000) arguments to explain why anti-inflationary monetary 
policies find political support even in an environment where a majority of voters is pro-inflation. 
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translates, under majority voting, into the adoption of more redistributive policies.8 Cross country 
data, however, do not seem to support such prediction. Perotti (1996) does not find any significant 
relationship between inequality and the share of transfer or public expenditure on GDP and, among 
advanced countries, Rodriguez (1998) actually finds a negative relationship. 9  
As for public expenditure in education, Zhang (2002), by decomposing aggregate education 
spending into expenditure shares on different school levels, uncovers a negative and significant 
relationship between inequality and public education expenditures. His sample includes most of 
countries with democratic political institutions10. 
Recently, a strand of the literature on income distribution and redistributive policies, departing from 
the majority voting model, has focused on asymmetries in political influence to explain the negative 
link between income inequality and redistribution. In Benabou (2000), for example, the pivotal 
voter is richer than the median, reflecting the fact that richer individuals have more political weight. 
The same argument is also used by Rodriguez (1998) in a model of lobbying. He shows that greater 
inequality can be associated to more regressive tax systems. His result depends on having ruled out 
the possibility of lobbying by the poor. Similarly, Gradstein (2003) argues that since the rich exert 
more political pressure, through rent seeking, public spending is biased in their favour. Zhang 
(2002) develops a more complex special interest political economy model in which the asymmetries 
in political influence are derived from a model of campaign contributions with endogenous lobbies 
formation. The allocation of public education expenditures is the result of the strategic interaction 
between the incumbent government and the lobbies. The economy might reach different steady 
states which exhibit persistent differences in income distribution and redistributive education 
policy. 
This paper joins the last strand of research by taking a new approach. We mantain the hypothesis of 
symmetric political influence – as in the standard voting models- but, by assuming a 
multidimensional policy space, we obtain political outcomes which strongly differ from those 
predicted by the majority voting approach, contributing to bridging the gap between theory and 
empirical findings. 
In our model, first period public investment in education is financed in deficit by selling 
government bonds. There are no commitment devices and future governments can renege on the 
                                                 
8
 See Alesina Rodrick (1994) and Persson Tabellini (1994). In these works, the positive link between inequality and 
redistribution, helps explaining the inverse relationship between initial income or wealth inequality and growth (as 
redistribution generates disincentives for capital accumulation). 
9
 See also studies reviewed in Benabou (1996). 
10
 For developing countries, Birdsall (1997) notes that spending on primary education is small relative to spending on 
tertiary education.Taking a sample of 21 developing countries, Gradstein (2003) shows that the bias in the incidence of 
public spending in education closely mirrors the skewness in income distribution. 
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promise to repay public debt. The feasibility of the public investment is thus strongly linked to the 
future political decision about public debt repayment.  
In the second period, policymakers redistribute resources using two instruments: a linear income 
tax, which redistributes resources between low and high income individuals and a tax on bond 
holdings (debt default rate), which redistributes resources from bond-holders to tax-payers. 
Education funding, by affecting future income distribution, might change the policy chosen by 
future policymakers. Specifically, investment in primary education might reduce future income 
inequality up to the point in which the debt redemption policy catalyses the political conflict. In this 
case, with probability one, the political outcome on this dimension will be that preferred by the 
majority of voters, that is, default on public debt. On the contrary, investment in tertiary education, 
by increasing future income inequality, deflects attention from the debt redemption policy. Fiscal 
policy catalyses the political conflict, giving greater credibility to debt repayment promises. 
The main result of our model is that, in equilibrium, investment in tertiary education might be 
observed even if the costituency of the incumbent government consists of individuals who would 
benefit most from primary education. The novelty of our contribution lies on the fact that we 
explain the bias in the education expenditure without referring to the hypothesis of asymmetric 
political influence. Our result relies on the recognition that an investment, by altering future 
individual’s productive abilities, might lead to changes in preferences for redistribution, making the 
investment politically unfeasible.  
The last point relates our paper to the strand of literature which emphasizes political failures in 
representative democracies (Besley and Coate, 1998). Furthermore, the paper is also related to 
literature concerned with political determinants of public debt credibility (Aghion and Bolton, 1990 
and Dixit and Lodregan, 2000). 
 
3 The Model 
3.1 The Economic Environment 
Consider a two-period open economy with a continuum of individuals of measure one.11 In the first 
period, there is no production and agents differ in their exogenous initial endowment ai, which is 
distributed in the population according to a known distribution Φ, with mean a and support (0, A ), 
where A  is a parameter. In the second period, production comes from labour. All individuals are 
endowed with one unit of labour but differ in their ability ie to produce (productivity). If individual 
i supplies one unit of labour he produces ii ey =  units of consumption good. Differences in income 
are thus determined by differences in abilities. For simplicity, we assume that the population is 
                                                 
11
 This implies that aggregate and average values coincide. 
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divided into two ability types, low and high. Let Le  denote the first period productivity of low 
ability individuals and )( LH ee > that of high ability individuals. We assume that ei is distributed in 
the population according to a known distribution function:  Lγ  is  the fraction of low productivity 
while LH γγ −= 1  is the fraction of high productivity citizens and e is the average productivity. 
 
At the beginning of the first period, the incumbent government issues bonds to finance a public 
investment equal to b in per capita terms (in the first period endowments cannot be taxed). The 
government is constitutionally binded to spend b in education, but it is free to choose whether to 
invest in primary (E1) or tertiary education (E3). The two investments are mutually exclusive12. 
Public spending in education is productive raising individual’s second period abilities. Specifically, 
investing in primary education (E1) raises the productivity of low ability individuals, so that 
LL eEe >)( 1  and HH eEe =)( 1 ; investing in tertiary education (E3) raises the productivity of high 
ability individuals, that is HH eEe >)( 3  and LL eEe =)( 3 .  
At the beginning of the second period an election takes place. The elected policymaker sets the debt 
redemption policy and the fiscal policy. The debt redemption policy is described by the choice of a 
debt default rate [ ]0,qpi ∈ , where q is the promised interest rate on government’s bonds13. Fiscal 
policy involves the choice of the parameters of a linear income tax, i.e. the tax rate [ ]1,0∈τ  and the 
per capita guarantee ℜ∈g 14. Government budget constraints (in average terms) for the first and 
second period, respectively, are given by : 
sb =   
and  
gEebr l −=+ )()1( τ  
where s is the average per-capita demand for government bonds, r is the interest rate paid on 
government bonds15 and e(El) is average income, which depends on public investment lE  with 
3,1=l . 
In the following, we assume that public investment in education is potentially Pareto improving 
(given available redistributive instruments). 
                                                 
12
 For the sake of simplicity, we focus on this extreme case. 
13
 We assume that the government might renege only on the promise to service the debt. However, qualitative results do 
not depend on this assumption. 
14
 With tax system (τ , g ) an individual with pre-tax income ie  has a tax bill of -gieτ . 
15The interest rate r paid on bonds will be zero when pi= q and equal to q when pi = 0: [ ]qr ,0∈ .  
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Assumption 1. beEe l )1()( δ+>−    for 3,1=l . 
where 
δ
 is the individuals’ rate of time preference. Assumption 1 guarantees also the sustainability 
of government debt when 
δ
 = r
16
.  
 Let ic1  and ic2  be individual’s consumption at time one and two respectively and let 
 ( )1 21( ) ,1i i iW U c cδ= + +                                   (1) 
be the individual’s intertemporal utility function, where, U(·) is twice continuously differentiable 
and concave. 
Utility is maximized under the two budget constraints: 
 
iii asc =+1  
 
ie
l
ii srgEec )1()()1(2 +++−= τ ; 
where, si stands for savings, er  is the expected interest rate on savings and e i(El) is second period 
income. 
There is a world capital market where borrowing and lending take place at the given real world 
interest rate rw which, for simplicity, is assumed to be equal to the rate of time preference 
δ
. We 
exclude private borrowing referring to financial markets imperfections which prevent individuals, 
who are consumption constrained in the first period, from borrowing. If individual i desires to save, 
he can either buy foreign bonds (fi) or domestic government’s bonds (bi). We assume that the 
exchange rate (with the rest of the world) is fixed and equal to one and the two bonds are perfect 
substitutes. This means that the expected interest rate on public debt (re) must be equal, in 
equilibrium, to the world interest rate: ( we rr = ) and government issues bonds at the nominal rate 
ewrq pi+= , where epi  is the expected rate of default.  
 
3.2 Economic equilibrium 
In this section individuals are considered as economic agents who take current and expected future 
policies as given. We assume that in period 1 individuals know their future productivity level. 
Solving the i-th individual optimisation problem , we obtain: 
 
( ) ( )1 1
1
1 if 1
ˆ
otherwise
i
i c c
i
U U a
c
a
− − <
= 

                    (2) 
and 
 
( ) ( ) ( )


 <−
=
−−
otherwise0
1if1
ˆ
11 i
cc
i
ii aUUaas                    (3) 
                                                 
16
 As we will show in the following sections,  this is actually the equilibrium outcome. 
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Optimal consumption in the first period is equal to )1(1−cU . However, if the individual is wealth-
constrained, he cannot consume more than ai and his savings will be nil. 
From the last expression, optimal aggregate savings can be derived: 
  ( )( )
( )
∫
−
Φ−= −
A
U
c
i
c
dUas
1
1
1
1ˆ .                                      (4) 
From the second period budget constraint we obtain second period consumption 17: 
gsrEec il
ii e +++−= ˆ)1()()1(ˆ2 τ                                                  (5) 
 
We further assume that individuals, at the world interest rate, have a bias in favour of domestic 
bonds and that the government issues bonds so as to satisfy desired savings: bs =ˆ . Then ii bs ≡ˆ  
and 0=if . Let Pγ  be the fraction of poor citizens, that is those with bbi < , and PR γγ −= 1  
the fraction of rich citizens, that is those with bbi ≥ . 
 
3.3 Political preferences 
Individual’s political preferences can be derived from the indirect utility function. Since the gains 
from public spending in education depend on the fiscal policy that will be chosen in the second 
period, we proceed backwards. In the second period, the investment in education El and the 
promised interest rate q are given. Allowing for the government budget constraint, the individual’s 
indirect utility function can be written as18 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )bbqEeEeW illii −⋅−++⋅+⋅−= piττpiτ 1)()(1,ˆ               (6) 
 
To determine voters’ preferences about fiscal policy and about the debt redemption policy, we look 
at the impact of these policies on individuals’ welfare: 
 
i
i
ll
i
bbW
EeEeW i
−=
−=
∧
∧
∂pi
∂
∂τ
∂ )()(
                                  (7) 
                                                 
17
 Non negativity of first period consumption is ensured by non-negativity of initial endowment, ai. Non-negativity of 
second period consumption for all individuals, including those who save nothing in the first period, requires 
( )1 ( )i le E gτ− > − . 
18
 Policy preferences about debt redemption and fiscal policies can be described by the individuals’ indirect utility 
function as a function of pi, g and τ. However, given the government’s budget constraint, only two of them can be freely 
set. 
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From (7) it is immediate to verify that the i-th individual’s preferred fiscal policy is 1=Lτ  if his 
productivity is low and 0=Hτ  if her productivity is high. Thus, less productive individuals prefer a 
100% tax rate associated to a lump sum transfer equal to bqEeg l )1()( pi−+−= , whereas more 
productive individuals prefer zero income taxation associated to a lump sum tax (negative transfer) 
equal to bqg )1( pi−+−= .  
Moreover, (7) shows that individual’s preferences about the debt default rate depend on the amount 
of government debt holdings. Those with bbi ≥  (rich citizens) prefer full repayment ( 0=pi ). On 
the contrary, those with bb i <  (poor citizens) prefer total default on debt service ( q=pi ).  
On the basis of the preferences on the two policy instruments, four groups of individuals can be 
distinguished: 
{ } { } { } { }bbeeiHRbbeeiLRbbeeiHPbbeeiLP iHiiLiiHiiLi ≥==≥==<==<== ;,;,;,; . 
 
To establish individuals preferences about public spending in education, we compute the value of 
the indirect utility function distinguishing for the individual’s ability, the investment’s type and the 
(second period) fiscal rule. In what follows, we maintain the hypothesis that 0=pi  and we rrq == , 
otherwise no public debt could be issued. In the next section, we will solve the political game and 
find the conditions which ensure full repayment of public obligations.  
Let ( )ˆ ,ik lW E τ  indicate individual i’s indirect utility function in period 1 when his productivity type 
is k (k=L,H), public spending in education is El and income tax is τ . Allowing for the government 
budget constraints, we obtain: 
 ( ) { }ieelkiki brbrEeEecUEW )1()1()()()1(1
1)ˆ(,ˆ 11 +++−+−++= ττδτ  
Proposition 1. If )() ( 31 EeEe =  then low productivity individuals prefer investment in primary 
education and high productivity individuals prefer investment in tertiary education, whatever the 
second period electoral outcome is. 
Proof:  
It is easy to work out: 
( ) { }1 1 11 1ˆ ˆ ˆ, ( ) ( ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( )1 1ik L i e e i i iW E U c e E r b r b U c e E b bτ δ δ= + − + + + = + − ++ +  
( ) { }3 3 31 1ˆ ˆ ˆ, ( ) ( ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( )1 1ik L i e e i i iW E U c e E r b r b U c e E b bτ δ δ= + − + + + = + − ++ +  
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( ) { }1 1 11 1ˆ ˆ ˆ, ( ) ( ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( )1 1ik H i k e e i i k iW E U c e E r b r b U c e E b bτ δ δ= + − + + + = + − ++ +  
( ) { }3 31 1ˆ ˆ ˆ, ( ) ( ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( 3)1 1ik H i k e e i i k iW E U c e E r b r b U c e E b bτ δ δ= + − + + + = + − ++ +  
Then, since the two investments in education have the same effects on aggregate production 
( )() ( 31 EeEe = ), it is straightforward to verify that, when Lττ = , low productivity individuals are 
indifferent to the allocation of public spending between primary and tertiary education. Moreover, 
assumption 1 guarantees that the participation constraint is satisfied (i.e. public investment is 
preferred to the no investment alternative). On the contrary, when Hττ =  low productivity 
individuals strictly prefer investment in primary education. Again it is easy to verify that the 
participation constraint is satisfied. Analogous results apply to high productivity individuals, that is, 
they strictly prefer investment in tertiary education when the fiscal rule preferred by high 
productivity individuals is anticipated and they are indifferent in the complementary case. ■  
Thus, we can conclude that low productivity individuals prefer investment in primary education and 
high productivity individuals prefer investment in tertiary education, independently of the fiscal 
policy implemented in the second period.  
 
4. The Political Process  
This section provides a description of political decision making in both periods. We begin with the 
second period election and policy choice, taking as given the public investment in education. Then, 
we analyse first period policy choice, recognizing that the incumbent government and individuals 
will anticipate the dependence of second period choices on the first period decision on the 
allocation of public spending in education. 
 
4.1 Period two election  
At the beginning of the second period an election takes place. There are two parties: party A and 
party B. All members of party A are low productivity and all members of party B are high 
productivity. Both parties contain a mixture of poor and rich individuals. Parties select candidates 
by majority voting and then individuals vote according to their political preferences. As in Besley 
and Coate’s (1997) citizen-candidate model, we assume that no ex-ante commitment is possible: 
once elected, citizen i chooses either the tax rate 1=Lτ , if he is low productivity or the tax rate 
0=Hτ  if she is high productivity and chooses q=pi  if he is poor and 0=pi  if she is rich. Parties 
choose the candidate that a majority of their members prefer. 
In what follows we assume:  
 11 
ASSUMPTION 2 
(i) Pγ  > Rγ  
(ii) bbandbb mBmA <<  
 
where mzb   with Z= A,B stands for  public debt holding of the median member of party Z. 
Assumption 2 tells us that the majority of population are poor (i), as well as the majority of each 
party’s members (ii). 
There are two types of voters. A fraction µ  are rational voters: they vote the candidate whose 
proposed policy maximises their pay-off function. The remaining fraction are noise voters. A 
fraction η  of the noise vote goes to the party A, where η  is a random variable distributed in the 
interval [0,1] according to the cumulative distribution function H(η ). H is symmetric, so that 
)−(1−=) ηη H1H( .The presence of noise voters makes the electoral outcome probabilistic. Let ω  
represent the difference between the fraction of voters obtaining a higher utility from the policy 
chosen by party A and the fraction of voters who benefits most from party B’s policy. Then, party A 
wins if 
 ( ) ( )( )ηµηµµω −−>−+ 111  
that is, 
 ( ) 2
1
12
+
−
−
>
µ
µωη . 
Consequently, given ω, the probability that party A wins is given by: 
 
( ) ( ) 




+
−
−Η−=Ψ
2
1
12
1
µ
µω
ω . 
We assume that the fraction of noise voters in the population is sufficiently high so that if fiscal 
policy were the only issue, both parties would have a positive probability of winning the election, 
i.e. ( ) ( )1,0∈−Ψ HL γγ . This is verified when  µ
µγγ −<− 1HL 19.  
                                                 
19
  The description of the noise vote is based on Besley and Coate (2000) . 
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An election gives rise to a game between the two parties in which each party’s strategy has two 
dimensions and can be represented by a policy vector hZ = (τ Z, π Z) with { }BAZ ,∈ . A Nash 
equilibrium is a couple of policy vectors, h*Z= (τ *Z,, π *Z ), one for each party, which are mutual best 
responses. Party members know the election probabilities associated with different candidate pairs 
and take them into account when voting for candidate. Thus party { }BAZ ,∈  chooses a citizen-
candidate whose preferences about fiscal policy and debt redemption policy maximise the expected  
median member’s payoff . 
  
4.2 Period two policy choices 
In order to analyse the political equilibrium in the second period, the knowledge of the linear 
income tax  and the debt default rate preferred by each citizen is not enough. Assumptions have to 
be set on the priority given by each citizen to the two policies. Since citizens have only one vote but 
each party’s strategy is bi-dimensional, when voting individuals have to compare the gain from the 
preferred debt redemption policy with the gain from the preferred fiscal policy. 
For the i-th citizen, the welfare gain from the preferred debt redemption policy is given by: 
 ( ) ( ) bbqqWW iii −=− ,ˆ0,ˆ ττ  
On the other hand, the gain from the preferred fiscal policy is given by: 
 ( ) ( ) )()(,ˆ,ˆ lilHiLi EeEeWW −=− piτpiτ  
 
In what follows, we assume that the gain from the preferred debt redemption policy is so big as to 
overcome the gain from the preferred fiscal policy only for very rich individuals, those with 
bbi 2> . This minority casts their vote firstly looking at a candidate attitude towards debt 
repayment. On the contrary, for the majority of the population, those with 2ib b≤ , fiscal policy is 
the salient  issue and they cast their vote firstly looking at a candidate attitude towards this policy. 
 
ASSUMPTION 3: 
 (i) )()(max lili EeEebbq −>− when bbi 2>  
 (ii) )()(min lil EeEeqb −<  
The last expression, which is obtained for the poorest individuals, i.e. those who do not hold bonds, 
implies that fiscal policy is the salient issue,- i.e. the gain from the preferred debt redemption policy 
is smaller than the gain from the preferred fiscal policy- for all individuals with 2ib b≤ . 
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The next assumption gives the conditions under which the equilibrium involves both parties 
selecting candidates who share the fiscal policy preferences of their members, but have non-
majoritarian debt redemption policy preferences. 
 
 
ASSUMPTION 4: 
For { }BAZ ,∈ , 



=
=
=
BZwhenH
AZwhenL
k   and  



=
=
=−
AZwhenH
BZwhenL
k  
(i) ( ) ( )( ) ( )k P Rk k l le E e E qγ γ γ γ−Ψ − − > Ψ − ( )mZbb −  
(ii) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )VR VR k VR VR mk k k k k k l l k k k k Ze E e E q b bγ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ− − − Ψ − − Ψ − − + − > Ψ − − + −    
where ( )( ) ( )VR VRk k k kγ γ γ γ −Ψ − − +  is the probability that party Z wins when choosing (τ k, 0) while the 
opponent party is choosing (τ -k, q) and debt policy is salient for a fraction VRkγ  of very rich 
individuals, whose productivity is of type k (the same as party Z members). In this circumstances, 
party Z obtains the support of voters who share its members’ preferences about fiscal policy and for 
whom debt policy is not salient (a fraction VRk kγ γ−  of the population). At the same time, the 
opponent party attains the support of voters with preferences about fiscal policy different from those 
of party Z members plus the support of voters with the same preferences about fiscal policy but for 
whom debt policy is salient (a fraction VRk kγ γ −+  of the population). 
If (i) is satisfied, the gain from choosing the preferred fiscal policy is greater than the gain from 
compromising on the fiscal policy and choosing the majoritarian debt redemption policy ( q=pi ), 
while the opponent chooses the policy preferred by the very rich ( 0=pi ). If (ii) is satisfied, when 
both parties are choosing the non-majoritarian debt redemption policy, preferred by the individuals 
for whom monetary policy is salient, switching to the one which maximises the party pay-off is not 
convenient. In fact, the gain from switching to the preferred debt policy (RHS) does not compensate 
the loss due to the reduced probability of winning the election (LHS). 
 
Thus, even if the majority of the two parties members, as well as the majority of the population, 
prefer to default on debt service, the best choice for each party is a rich candidate. Intuitively, if 
party B is choosing a rich candidate then, under the conditions stated in assumption 4, the best-reply 
for party A is to make the same choice. In fact, if party A were to choose a poor candidate it would 
loose the votes of very rich low-productivity individuals, for whom debt policy is salient. A 
symmetric reasoning ensures that party B will choose a rich candidate. Therefore, the equilibrium 
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policy vectors will be h*A= (τ L, 0) and h*B= (τ H, 0) and party A will win with probability ( )L Hγ γΨ − . 
This result is proved in the next proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 2: If assumptions 2, 3 and 4 hold, then the non-majoritarian outcome( 0=pi ) is 
chosen with probability one. 
Proof: see appendix. 
 
 
4.3 Politically viable debt and first period choice of education 
We now turn to a description of the political equilibrium in period 1 in which a decision has to be 
taken on how to allocate the investment in education. From proposition 2, we know that in order to 
exclude a political equilibrium featuring inflation, fiscal policy should be the salient issue for all 
individuals but for the richest segment of population (assumption 3). 
 
Without loss of generality let us assume HL γγ >  then )()()()( lHllLl EeEeEeEe −<− 20. 
Thus, political feasibility of the investment in primary education requires: 
b
w
L
r
eEe −
<
)( 1
 
where we have used the condition wrq = . 
On the other hand, investment in tertiary education is feasible when 
b
w
L
r
eEe −
<
)( 3
 
Political feasibility increases as wr  decreases and income (productivity) dispersion around its mean 
increases. Under the conditions stated in assumption 3, the two investments are both feasible; thus, 
we can derive the following proposition 
PROPOSITION 3 
If party A (B) is in power, in the first period, public spending will finance primary (tertiary) 
education. 
 
Now we relax assumption 3 and  assume the following: 
ASSUMPTION 3 bis 
                                                 
20
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In other words, political investment in tertiary education, increasing income inequality, guarantees 
that for the majority of population fiscal policy is the salient issue (iii). The conflict over debt policy 
is salient only for a minority of rich individuals and proposition 2 holds (i). On the contrary, 
investment in primary education, reducing income dispersion around its mean, lessens the conflict 
over fiscal policy making debt policy salient for the poorest segment of the population that is pro-
default (ii). In this case Proposition 3 does not hold and it is not possible to exclude an equilibrium 
where the default rate is q. 
 
PROPOSITION 4 
If beEeHL )1())()(( 3 δγγ +≥−−Ψ  and given assumption 2, 3bis and 4, public spending will 
finance tertiary education whatever party is in power in the first period. 
Proof. Spending in primary education will signal that, in the second period, debt could be reneged. 
Nobody would buy domestic debt in this case. Spending in tertiary education signals that future 
conflict over fiscal policy will deflect attention from the debt tax and full debt redemption is assured 
by the existence of an anti-default minority. Party A, whose constituency is composed of low 
productivity individuals, is better off by spending in tertiary education than spending nothing. The 
condition beEeHL )1()()(( 3 δγγ +≥−−Ψ , in fact, guarantees the satisfaction of the participation 
constraint in expected value.  
 
Note that political sustainability of public spending in primary education increases if the initial 
distribution of wealth is more equitable. This means that the bias in public spending closely mirrors 
skewness of wealth distribution. Moreover if high ability individuals are concentrated on the richest 
 16 
segment of the population21 the allocation of public education spending might be responsible of 
persistent inequality. 
 
5. Concluding remarks  
It has frequently been argued that the incidence of public spending in education, far from being 
uniform, is biased in favour of the rich. This paper has presented a model in which this bias is 
politically determined. 
Recent literature on income inequality and redistribution explains the existence of a negative 
relationship between inequality and redistribution by appealing to asymmetric political influence. 
Specifically, assuming richer individuals to be politically more influent causes their preferences to 
be pivotal in deciding redistribution policies. Differently from this literature, we mantain the 
hypothesis of symmetric political influence – as in the standard voting models- but, by assuming a 
multidimensional policy space, we obtain results which fit with empirical findings. 
Our model is a two period very simple representation of the interaction between public spending in 
education and electoral politics. Public investment in education is financed in deficit by selling 
government bonds. In absence of credible commitment devices the possibility to finance the 
investment is strongly linked to the future political decision about public debt repayment. We show 
that education funding, by affecting future income distribution, might change political choice of 
future policy makers, making issuing debt unfeasible. Specifically, investment in primary education 
might reduce future income inequality up to the point in which redistribution of resources through a 
tax on debt becomes more effective than redistributing through a linear income tax. In this case, if 
the majority of the population is poor, nobody would believe that debt will be eventually repaid. On 
the contrary, investment in tertiary education, by increasing future income inequality, gives greater 
credibility to debt repayment promises. 
The most relevant result of this paper is that an equilibrium with investment in tertiary education 
might be observed even if the costituency of the incumbent government consists of individuals who 
would benefit most from investment in primary education. This result does not rely on asymmetric 
political influence- i.e. the beneficiaries of tertiary education are also the most influential political 
group- but on the recognition that an investment, by altering individual’s productive abilities, might 
lead to changes in preferences for redistribution, making the investment politically unfeasible.  
 
 
                                                 
21
 See De Nardi (2000) for a theoretical model with human capital links in which children partially inherit the 
productivity of their parents. In this case more productive parents leave larger bequest to their children who in turn are 
more productive than average.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof of proposition 2: 
We have to show that, under assumptions 2, 3 and 4 , h*A= (τ L, 0) and h*B= (τ H, 0) represent Nash 
equilibrium strategies of the policy game, that is h*A = (τ L, 0) is the best response to h*B = (τ H, 0) and 
vice versa. We concentrate on the choice of the party A. A similar argument applies in the case of 
the opponent party. The specified strategies bring about the following expected pay-off for party 
A’s median member: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
.
)(1)()(10,,0, bebebbqhhWE LHLHLmAHBLA
m
A γγγγττη −Ψ−+−Ψ+−+=





==
∧
 
In order to show that hA = (τ L, 0) is the best response to party B’s strategy, we have to compare the 
previous expected pay-off with the pay-off obtainable by choosing the alternative strategies: (τ L, q), 
(τ H, q), (τ H, 0). 
 
(τ L, 0) is certainly preferred to (τ H, 0) if ( ) 0L Hτ τΨ − > . If party A were to choose hA = (τ H, q), then 
monetary policy would be the unique policy at stake. Therefore, the expected pay-off for the party 
A’s median member would be: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ), , ,0 ( ) 1 ( ) 1
.
m
H H P R L m P R L m
A A B A AE W h q h e b b b e b q b bη τ τ γ γ γ γ
∧ 
   = = = Ψ − + − + − Ψ − ⋅ + + −     
 
 
The difference between the two expected pay-off can be computed to be equal to: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
,0 , ,0 , , ,0
( ) ( ) .
m m
L H H H
A AA B A B
L P R m
L H A
E W h h E W h q h
e b e b q b b
η ητ τ τ τ
γ γ γ γ
∧ ∧   
   = = − = = =
   
   
 = Ψ − − − Ψ − −
 
 
Under assumption 4.(i), the above expression is positive and party A prefers the strategy (τ L,0) to 
(τ H, q). 
 
Finally, by choosing hA = (τ L, q) party A would loose the votes of rational, low-productivity and 
very-rich voters (which we indicate with VRLγ ): 
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The difference between the two expected pay-off can be computed to be equal to: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( )
,0 , ,0 , , , 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
m m
L H L H
A AA B A B
VR VR L VR VR m
L H L L L H L L L H A
E W h h E W h q h
e b e b q b b
η ητ τ τ τ
γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ
∧ ∧   
   = = − = = =
   
   
 = Ψ − − Ψ − − + ⋅ − − Ψ − − + −
 
 
Under assumption 4.(ii), the above expression is positive and party A prefers the strategy (τ L, 0) to 
(τ L, q). This shows that h*A= (τ L, 0) is the best response to h*B= (τ H, 0). Q.E.D. 
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